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Abstract:  
This paper contributes in economic literature by investigating the impact of defense spending on 
income inequality in case of Iran using time series data over the period of 1971-2011. For this 
purpose, we have applied the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration for long run 
relationship in the presence of structural breaks arising in the series. The stationarity properties 
of the variables are tested using structural break unit root tests. The causal relationship between 
defense spending and income inequality is examined by employing the VECM Granger causality 
approach. Our findings validate the long run relationship between the series. The results indicate 
that defense spending improves income distribution in Iran. An inverted-U shaped relationship 
exists between defense spending and income inequality while economic growth reduces income 
inequality. The causality analysis reveals that defense spending Granger causes income 
inequality and feedback effect exists between income inequality and economic growth.   
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I. Introduction 
This paper investigates the relationship between military spending and income inequality which 
is ignored in the existing literature focused on Iran. The existing defense economics literature on 
Iran provides some inconclusive evidence on military spending and income inequality nexus 
(Ali, 2007). Meng et al. (2014) noted that the mechanism between defense spending and income 
inequality is quite complex. There are many factors that affect income inequality in the case of 
Iran but our attention is to provide a clear, rigorous and impartial study. The wages earned by 
labor employed in defense or defense related industries increases with an increase in defense 
spending. Wages will be increased during the inter-industry dispersion as rents paid by the 
industry to inelastic portion of personnel (working in defense industry) rises. On the contrary, if 
initial wages are high in defense or defense linked industries then relative wages will be low with 
the reduction in defense spending which leads to decline in income inequality. The efficiency 
wage theory asserts that workforce enjoys high wages in defense or defense related industries. 
This implies that defense spending and income inequality are endogenous variables (Ali, 2003; 
Ali and Galbraith, 2007). Furthermore, Opportunity Cost Burden Effect Model (OCBM) reveals 
a trade-off between increased defense spending and reduced spending on development projects 
that tends to increase income inequality in the society (Chaitanya, 2008). It is documented that 
income inequality in the society is associated with low social and human development and rise in 
military spending on the cost of diminishing returns on social sector’s development. The rapid 
increase in military expenditure leads to rise in total government spending also. In the long run, 
positive impact of government spending is nullified if productive resources of an economy are 
transferred for financial support of military spending. The downside to increase in military 
spending is that it forces the government to curtail spending on development projects (Chaitanya, 
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2008). This shows that “cost of best alternative use (opportunity cost) is forgone by the country 
as it diverts development spending towards funding the defense sector growth requirement” 
(Chaitanya, 2008; pp. 3)1. 
 
Geographically, Iran is located in the Middle East and has neighboring borders with Afghanistan 
and Iraq, on the Eastern and Western sides. Both these counties are mired by political instability, 
civil war and hostile atmosphere over the last decade. On the other hand, Iran has unfriendly 
military relations with US and its allies. This background assigns high importance to the role of 
defense spending in Iran despite the economy experiencing negative economic growth and high 
inflation in recent years. At the same time, the government is trying to reduce income inequality 
and has reformed the subsidy plans by targeting subsidies on food and energy. In this context, 
any study related to income inequality is relevant and important. Our results illustrate that high 
defense spending could reduce income inequality. Based on our finding, it seems that the 
sanctioned and war threatened economies could reduce the income inequality through increase in 
defense spending. 
 
The main objective of present study is to examine the effect of defense spending on income 
distribution over the period of 1971-2011 in case of Iran. This is a pioneering effort investigating 
the relationship between military spending and income inequality by incorporating economic 
growth in inequality function in case of Iran. We apply structural break unit root tests to test 
stationarity properties of the variables2. We also utilize the ARDL bounds testing approach to 
                                                             
1 Chaitanya, (2008) has explained Opportunity Cost Burden Effect Model with help of diagram. 
2 The results of all studies regarding unit root properties of the variables are biased. The traditional unit root tests do 
not have information regarding structural break stemming in the series. 
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cointegration in the presence of structural breaks for long run relationship between the variables. 
The ordinary least square (OLS) and error correction model (ECM) are used to analyze long run 
and short run dynamics between the series. The direction of causality between the variables is 
examined by applying the VECM Granger causality framework. Our findings report that 
cointegration between the variables exists for long run relationship in case of Iran. Military 
spending reduces income inequality while inverted-U shaped hypothesis between military 
spending and income inequality is validated. Economic growth reduces income inequality and 
there is bidirectional causality between economic growth and income inequality and military 
spending Granger causes income inequality.   
 
The rest of the study is organized as following: section-II presents the review of literature, 
empirical model and estimations strategy is constructed in section-III, section-IV deals with 
results and their discussion, conclusion and policy implications are drawn in section-V. 
 
II. Review of Literature 
There are many studies based on the association between military spending and economic 
growth3, however, there is still dearth in the field of military spending and income inequality. 
Gradtien et al. (2001) reported that democratization environment of political institutions causes 
to improve income distribution. Further, they concluded that strong correlation between smooth 
functioning of democratic institution and higher wage rate decline income inequality. These 
results are supported by Lipset et al. (1993); Diamand, (1992) and Rodrik, (1999). Dinardo et al. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
3 See Tiwari and Shahbaz, (2012); Shahbaz et al. (2013)  
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(1996) showed that de-unionization is an important factor to perk up wage inequality. There are 
numerous factors that affect wage structure in an economy like relative decentralization of wage-
setting mechanism, institutional policies towards labour laws wage adjustment. Loony, (1990) 
determined the interaction between military/civilian regime and socio-economic performance. 
The results indicated that LDCs have high defense burden because these nations have large 
proportion of budget spending on military needs. Similarly; Melman, (1974) documented that 
high income inequality is the economic cost of permanent war. Income transfer programs and 
military spending on federal budget deficit has been discussed by Seiglie, (1997) for US 
economy. Seiglie reported that defense spending and budget deficits are linked positively. 
Budget deficit is used to make income distribution more equal between black and white people. 
 
Our interest is to explore the studies investigating the relationship between military spending and 
income inequality. For example, Chaitanya, (2008) explored the relationship between military 
spending and income distribution using data of South Asia namely India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and 
Bangladesh using model based on opportunity cost burden effect theory. His panel regression 
analysis supports the view that military spending, arms imports and armed forces deteriorate 
income inequality. However, in another study on military spending and income inequality Lin 
and Ali, (2009) applied panel Granger non-causality test but did not find any causal relationship 
between said variables. Hirnissa et al. (2009) used the data of ASEAN countries to examine the 
impact of military spending on income inequality by applying the ARDL bounds testing 
approach to cointegration for long run relationship between the variables in the case of Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, India and South Korea. Their results indicated that the 
variables are cointegrated for long run relationship. Military spending Granger causes income 
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inequality in Malaysia, feedback effect is found between both variables in the case of Singapore 
and neutral relationship exists between military spending and income distribution in rest of the 
countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines, India and South Korea. 
 
In single country studies, Abell, (1994) explored the relationship between military spending and 
income inequality using data of United States by applying OLS regression. His finding unveiled 
that military spending worsens income inequality by controlling other macroeconomic variables 
such as economic growth, taxes, interest rates, non-military spending and inflation. After that, 
Ali and Galbraith, (2003) used panel regression to investigate the impact of GDP growth, per 
capita income, size of armed forces and military spending on income distribution. Their results 
indicated that military spending increases income inequality. Comton (2005) noted a negative 
relationship between military spending and income inequality in United States. He unveiled that 
increase in military spending generates more jobs for unskilled workers and improves income 
distribution. Additionally, Henderson et al. (2008) illustrated that cut in military spending 
increases income inequality. They claimed that employing the people in productive sectors and 
less productive sectors proportionately contribute to income inequality in United States. In case 
of Turkey; Ozsoy, (2008) noted that budget deficit is negatively correlated with transfer 
payments programs. The rise in military spending, education, health spending increases budget 
deficit and in turn, income inequality is increased. Later, Elveren, (2012) confirmed the findings 
of Ozsoy, (2008) by reporting that military spending Granger causes income inequality.  
 
Ali, (2012) used the data of Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries to examine the 
effect of defense spending on income distribution. Ali reported that military spending improves 
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income distribution and income inequality and economic growth have negative effect on military 
spending. Kentor et al. (2012) introduced high-tech weaponry as “new” military and used the 
military expenditure per soldier as a proxy of military capital intensiveness for 82 developed and 
less developed countries. Their results pointed out that high-tech military spending exacerbates 
income inequality. Recently, Töngür and Elveren, (2014) investigated the relationship between 
income inequality and military spending using data of 37 countries. They found the direct 
relationship between income inequality and defense spending. Meng et al. (2014) applied the 
pairwise Granger causality to test the causal relationship between income inequality and military 
spending using Chinese data over the period of 1989-2012. Their empirical evidence indicated 
that military spending Granger causes income inequality.  
 
Recently, Töngür and Elveren (2015) used Turkish time series data (1963-2008) to examine the 
impact of military spending and income inequality on economic growth. They found that military 
spending affects economic growth insignificant while income inequality stimulates economic 
growth. In Chinese economy, Meng et al. (2015) noted that income inequality is cause of defence 
spending in Granger sense i.e. shock occurs in denfence spending deteriorates income 
distribution. Wolde-Rufael, (2015) investigated the linkages between military spending and 
income inequality in Tiawan’s economy over the period of 1976-2011. The empirical evidence 
indicates that military spending is main driver to increase income inequality. This study is the 
first effort to fill this gap regarding Iranian economy while investigating the relationship between 
military spending and income inequality. 
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III- Modeling, Methodological Framework and Data Collection  
This study aims to investigate the linkage between defense spending and income inequality. Our 
model includes economic growth as an additional contributing factor towards income inequality 
and takes the following form:  
 
),( ttt YDfIE                                                                    (1) 
 
Where tIE  denotes income inequality, tD  shows defense spending and tY  indicates economic 
growth. In order to curtail acuity in the data and achieve consistent and reliable results we have 
transformed the entire series into its log-linear specification using logarithm (Shahbaz, 2010). 
The empirical model takes the following form: 
 
ittt YDIE   lnlnln 321                             (2) 
 
Where tIEln , is natural log of income inequality proxied by Gini-coefficient, tDln  is the natural 
log of defense spending per capita, tYln  is natural log of economic growth proxied by real GDP 
per capita, and   is residual term having zero mean and finite variance. In order to test for the 
nonlinear relationship, the squared term of defense spending is added to the model which is as 
following: 
 
ttttt YDDIE   lnlnlnln 44
2
332211      (3) 
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In equation-3, if: 033  and 044   then income inequality is decreasing, 033  and 044   
then income inequality is increasing, 033  and 044   then inverted-U shaped hypothesis is 
confirmed, 033  and 044   U-shaped relationship is accepted. 
 
Historically, in order to test stationarity properties of the variables, unit root tests such as ADF 
by Dickey and Fuller (1979), P-P by Philips and Perron (1988), KPSS by Kwiatkowski et al. 
(1992), DF-GLS by Elliott et al. (1996) and Ng-Perron by Ng-Perron, (2001) have been used. 
However, due to lack of information on structural break points, these tests produce unreliable 
results. To remove this anomaly, Zivot-Adndrews, (1992) suggested another model that allows 
us to accommodate single unknown structural break in the variables at level form, in the slope of 
trend component, and in the intercept and trend function. Zivot-Andrews unit root test fixes all 
points as potential for possible time break and does estimation through regression for all possible 
break points successively. Clemente et al. (1998) improved the methodology developed by 
Perron and Volgelsang, (1992) to allow for two unknown structural breaks and better handles the 
problems due to structural breaks compared to Perron and Volgelsang, (1992) and Zivot-
Andrews, (1992) unit root tests which can handle series with single unknown structural break.  
 
Since traditional approaches to cointegration have certain demerits, we have used the 
autoregressive distributed lag model or the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration 
accommodating the structural break stemming in the series. The ARDL bounds testing approach 
to cointegration has certain merits like it is flexible regarding integrating order of the variables 
whether variables are found to be stationary at I(1) or I(0) or I(1) / I(0). In addition, Monte Carlo 
investigation confirms that this approach is better suited for small sample size (Pesaran and Shin, 
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1999). Moreover, a dynamic unrestricted error correction model (UECM) can be derived from 
the ARDL bounds testing through a simple linear transformation. The UECM integrates the short 
run dynamics with the long run equilibrium without losing any information for the long run. The 
empirical equation of the ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration is given below: 
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Where,  denotes difference operator, s denotes residual terms, and DUM denotes dummy 
variable to capture the structural breaks arising in the series. The structural breaks are based on 
Clemente et al. (1998). F-statistics are computed to compare with upper and lower critical 
bounds generated by Pesaran et al. (2001) to test for existence of cointegration. The null 
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hypothesis to examine the existence of long run relationship between the variables is 
0:0  YDIEH   against alternate hypothesis is 0:  YDIEaH   of cointegration for 
equation-4. Using Pesaran et al. (2001) critical bounds, if computed F-statistic is more than 
upper critical bound (UCB) there is cointegration between the variables. If computed F-statistic 
does not exceed lower critical bound (LCB) the variables are not cointegrated for long run 
relationship. If computed F-statistic falls between lower and upper critical bounds then decision 
regarding cointegration between the variables is uncertain. However, since our sample size is 
small, critical bounds generated by Pesaran et al. (2001) may be inappropriate to take decision 
whether cointegration exists or not. Therefore, we use lower and upper critical bounds developed 
by Narayan, (2005). The stability tests, to scrutinize the stability of ARDL bounds testing 
estimates, have been applied i.e. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ (Brown et al. 1975). 
 
The ARDL bounds testing approach can be used to estimate long run relationships between the 
variables. For instance, if there is cointegration in equation-4 where income inequality ( tIE ), 
defense spending ( tD ) and economic growth ( tY ) are used as forcing variables then there is 
established long run relationship between the variables that can be molded in following equation 
given below: 
 
ittt YDIE   lnlnln 210    (18) 
 
where 121110 /,/,/  YDIE   and t is the error term supposed to be 
normally distributed. These long run estimates are computed using the ARDL bounds testing 
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approach to cointegration when income inequality ( tIE ) treated dependent variables. This model 
can be further improved by including other dependent variables. On confirmation of long run 
relationship, it is important to find the direction of causality as below: 
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where  (1 )L  denotes the difference operator and ECTt-1 denotes the  lagged residual term 
generated from long run relationship, tt 21 , and t3 are error terms assumed to be normally 
distributed with mean zero and finite covariance matrix. The long run causality is indicated by 
the significance of t-statistic connecting to the coefficient of error correction term ( 1tECT ) and 
statistical significance of F-statistic in first differences of the variables shows the evidence of 
short run causality between variables. Additionally, joint long-and-short runs causal relationship 
can be estimated by joint significance of both 1tECT  and the estimate of lagged independent 
variables. For instance, iib  0,12  shows that defense spending Granger-causes income 
inequality and causality is running from income inequality to defense spending indicated 
by iib  0,21 .  
 
The study covers the period of 1971-2011. The data on real GDP per capita, real military 
spending per capita and Gini-coefficient (income inequality), has been sourced from world 
development indicators (CD-ROM, 2012). For income inequality (Gini-coefficient) data, we 
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used observations for 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 and 2005. We have used extrapolation method to 
generate the time series data from 1971-2011 following Jamal, (2006). The graphical 
presentation of three variables is shown in Figure-1.  
 
Figure-1: Trends of Real GDP per Capita, Real Defense Spending per Capita and Gini-
coefficient  
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IV- Results and their Discussion  
Descriptive statistics of income inequality ( tIEln ), economic growth ( tYln ) and defense 
spending ( tDln ) are presented in Table-1. While sample means of economic growth and defense 
spending are positive, it is negative when income inequality is considered. Skewness and 
kurtosis are measures of the shape of the distribution. Positive skewness illustrates that all the 
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series are right-skewed. The value of kurtosis indicates that they are leptokurtic relative to a 
normal distribution. Jarque-Bera results show that the null hypothesis of normal distribution 
cannot be rejected implying that income inequality ( tIEln ), economic growth ( tYln ) and defense 
spending ( tDln ) have normal distributions with finite variance. The correlation analysis 
indicates that economic growth is positively correlated with income inequality. The negative 
correlation is found between defense spending and income distribution. There is a positive 
correlation between defense spending and economic growth.  
 
Table-1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variables  tIEln  tYln  tDln  
 Mean -0.8834  15.4696  11.5537 
 Median -0.9105  15.4323  11.4443 
 Maximum -0.6891  15.8075  12.4023 
 Minimum -1.0936  15.0898  11.0468 
 Std. Dev.  0.0853  0.1935  0.3748 
 Skewness  0.5470  0.0746  0.7974 
 Kurtosis  3.2455  2.0030  2.5512 
 Jarque-Bera  2.1481  1.7359  3.6893 
 Probability  0.3416  0.4198  0.1958 
tIEln   1.0000   
tYln   0.3067  1.0000  
tDln  -0.1132  0.4263  1.0000 
 
The next step is to test the integrating properties of variables. In doing so, we have applied the 
ADF and PP unit root tests and results are reported in Table-2. Our results indicate that the unit 
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root problem is found in the series of income inequality ( tIEln ), defense spending ( tDln ) and 
economic growth ( tYln ) with intercept and trend in level form. The variables are found to reject 
the hypothesis of non-stationarity with intercept and trend in their first differenced form. This 
shows that the variables are integrated at I(1). The main problem is that ADF and PP unit root 
tests have low explanatory power and null hypothesis is rejected when it is true and vice versa. 
Furthermore, these unit root tests do not accommodate information about break points in the 
series which may also be a cause of unit root problem in the series.  
 
Table-2: Unit Root Analysis 
 Variables  
ADF Unit Root Test PP Unit Root Test 
T-Statistic Prob. value T-Statistic Prob. value 
tIEln  -2.1195 (2) 0.5196 -2.8163 (6) 0.2541 
tYln  -2.0100 (3) 0.5787 -1.4990 (3) 0.8142 
tDln  -0.8290 (1) 0.9541 -1.3950 (3) 0.8472 
tIEln  -4.8278 (2)* 0.0020 -8.0260 (3)* 0.0000 
tYln  -3.5497 (1)* 0.0475 -3.5474 (3)** 0.0474 
tDln  -4.5838 (1)* 0.0038 -4.6002 (3)* 0.0037 
Note: * indicates significance at 1 per cent level of significance. () shows 
lag order.  
 
This issue is resolved by applying Zivot and Andrews (1992) structural break unit root test which 
accommodates information of single unknown break point in the series. The results are reported 
in Table-3 and we find that all the variables are non-stationary at level with intercept and trend in 
16 
 
the presence of structural breaks in the series. These structural breaks are 1980, 1986 and 2004 in 
the series of income inequality, economic growth and defense spending. Over the selected period 
of time, Iranian government implemented many economic reforms to stimulate economic growth 
process. For example, Iran implemented the nationalization policy in 1979 after outbreak of Iran-
Iraq war which affected economic activity and hence income inequality in 1980. In 1985, 
Economic Corporation Organization (ECO) was established to promote economic, technical and 
cultural corporation among Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Local elections held in Iran in 2003 
affected economic activity as well as defense spending in 2004. In first differenced form, all the 
variables are found to be stationary. This confirms that the variables have unique order of 
integration i.e. I(1).  
 
Table-3: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Test 
 Variables   Break Period   T-Statistic Findings  
tIEln  1980 -4.860 (2) Unit root exists 
tYln  1986 -5.006 (1) Unit root exists 
tDln  2004 -1.847 (2) Unit root exists 
tIEln  1982 -12.196 (3)* Stationary 
tYln  1982 -6.284 (2)* Stationary 
tDln  2004 6.556 (4)* Stationary 
Note: * indicates significance at 1 per cent level of 
significance. () shows lag order.  
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The computation of the ARDL F-statistic is sensitive with lag order selection of the variables. 
So, it is necessary to choose appropriate lag order of the variables by applying unrestricted vector 
autoregressive (VAR). Our results reveal that lag order 1 is appropriate confirmed by sequential 
modified LR test statistic (LR), final prediction error (FPE), Akaike information criterion (AIC), 
Schwarz information criterion (SC) and Hannan-Quinn information criterion (HQ) method. 
Based on selected lag length4 i.e. 1, we have applied the ARDL bounds testing approach to 
cointegration in the presence of structural breaks in the series. The structural break point in the 
series is indicated in 2nd row of Table-4. These break points are based on the findings of Zivot-
Andrews (1992) unit root test5.  
 
The results of ARDL test are reported in the Table-4. We find that our computed F-statistics are 
9.695 and 11.656 more than the upper bound at 5 per cent and 1 per cent significance levels once 
we used income inequality ( tIEln ) and economic growth ( tYln ) as dependent variables. We 
could not reject the hypothesis of no cointegration as we used defense spending ( tDln ) as 
dependent variable. This confirms the presence of two cointegrating vectors which show that 
there is a long-run relationship among defense spending, economic growth and income 
inequality over the period of 1971-2011 in the case of Iran.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Results are available upon request from authors. 
5 We put dummy variable to capture the impact of structural breaks indicated by Zivot and Andrews (1992) unit 
root test. 
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Table-4: The ARDL Bounds Testing Analysis  
Variable tIEln  tDln  tYln  
F-statistics 
(Break Year)  
9.695** 
(1980) 
1.514 
(2004) 
11.656* 
(1986) 
Critical values# 1 per cent level 5 per cent level 10 percent level 
Lower bounds 10.150 7.135 5.915 
Upper bounds 11.230 7.980 6.630 
Diagnostic tests 
2R  0.7430 0.2300 0.5031 
2RAdj   0.6513 -0.0515 0.3257 
NORMAL2  4.4014 0.2217 3.2123 
SERIAL2  4.6118 0.2606 0.5519 
ARCH2  2.2308 2.5079 0.2296 
WHITE2  3.1378 1.0660 0.6367 
REMSAY2  1.1481 8.5508 0.4880 
CUSUM Stable Unstable  Stable 
CUSUMsq Stable Stable  Stable 
Note: * shows the significance at 1% level.  
 
The long-run results are shown in Table-5. Our findings indicate that all coefficients are 
according to our expectations and statistically significant. Furthermore, a negative relationship 
between defense spending and income inequality is found. It is noted that all else same, a 1 
percent increase in defense spending will decline income inequality by 0.1167 per cent. This 
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relationship is statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance. These findings are 
contradictory with Abell, (1994) for US; Ali and Galbraith, (2003) for global data; Chaitanya, 
(2007) for South Asia; Ozsoy, (2008) for Turkey; Henderson et al. (2008); and Kentor et al. 
(2012) for 82 developed countries but consistent with Comton, (2005) for US; Ali, (2012) for  
MENA countries. The impact of economic growth on income inequality is positive and it is 
statistically significant at 1 percent level of significance. A 1 percent increase in economic 
growth exacerbates income inequality by 0.2536 percent keeping other things constant. These 
findings are consistent with Musai et al. (2011) and Keivani, (2011) in the case of Iran.   
 
Furthermore, we have included squared term of defense spending i.e. 2ln tD  to examine non-linear 
relationship between defense spending and income inequality. Our empirical exercise shows that 
inverted U-shaped relationship between defense spending and income inequality is found in the 
case of Iran. It is noted that signs of linear and nonlinear terms are positive and negative 
respectively and statistically significant at 5 percent level. This implies that a 1 percent increase 
in defense spending increases income inequality by 4.7783 percent (shown by linear term) while 
negative sign of squared term of defense spending (shown by nonlinear term) verifies the 
delinking point of income inequality and defense spending. Lastly, we have included dummy to 
capture the impact of nationalization policy on income inequality. We find that nationalization 
has negative impact on income inequality. This shows that implementation of the nationalization 
policy in 1979 improved income distribution in Iran. The lower segment of Table-5 reveals that 
residual term is normally distributed with constant variance and zero mean. There is no serial 
correlation between dependent variables and residual term and, same inference can be drawn for 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH). No evidence is found for the existence of 
20 
 
white heteroskedasticity. Moreover, model is well specified confirmed by Ramsey reset test 
statistic. 
 
Table-5: Long Run Analysis 
Dependent Variable = tIEln  
Model  Linear Model Nonlinear Model 
Variables Coefficient T. Statistic Coefficient T. Statistic 
Constant -3.4604* -3.7023 -31.0496** -2.3862 
tDln  -0.1167* -3.0168 4.7783** 2.1381 
2ln tD  …. …. -0.2059** -2.1607 
tYln  0.2536* 3.5395 0.1594** 2.2937 
tDUM  -0.1970* -7.4956 -0.1887* -6.7962 
Diagnostic Tests 
R2 0.2813 …. 0.2407 …. 
F-statistic 7.0454* …. 3.6986** …. 
NORMAL2  1.4023 (0.4960) 0.8653 (0.6486) 
SERIAL2  1.7638 (0.1144) 1.4306 (0.2220) 
ARCH2  2.0359 (0.3250) 1.8759 (0.1305) 
RAMSEY2  0.3449 (0.5607) 1.5443 (0.2224) 
Note: * and ** denote the significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
NORM2 is for normality test, SERIAL2 for LM serial correlation test, ARCH2 for 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and REMSAY2 for Resay Reset test. 
 
The short-run dynamics are investigated by applying the error correction model (ECM). Table-6 
illustrates the results of both linear and nonlinear models. The linear model shows that defense 
spending has positive impact on income inequality but it is statistically insignificant. The 
positive effect of economic growth is found on income inequality and significant at 5 percent. 
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This implies that by 1 percent increase in economic growth deteriorates income distribution by 
0.3681 percent. The nonlinear model indicates that inverted-U shaped relationship between 
defense spending and income inequality exists but it is insignificant. The impact of 
nationalization policy on income inequality is negative and it is statistically significant at 5 
percent level. The coefficient of 1tECM  indicates short run deviations towards long run 
equilibrium path. The sign of lagged error term of linear and nonlinear models are significant at 
5 percent level. The coefficient of 1tECM  is 0.3958 for linear and 0.4182 for nonlinear model. 
This means that deviations in short run towards long run are corrected by 39.58 and 41.82 
percent per year for linear and nonlinear models respectively.  
 
Table-6: Short Run Analysis 
Dependent Variable = tIEln  
Model  Linear Model Nonlinear Model 
Variables Coefficient T. Statistic Coefficient T. Statistic 
Constant -0.0069 -0.7039 -0.0033 -0.2766 
tDln  0.0549 1.1228 0.0479 0.8760 
2ln tD  …. …. -0.0982 -0.4815 
tYln  0.3681** 2.2347 0.3825** 2.6146 
tDUM  -0.0622** -2.1273 -0.0616** -2.0760 
1tECM  -0.3958** 2.8034 -0.4182** -2.7843 
Diagnostic Tests 
R2 0.3111 …. 0.3159 …. 
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F-statistic 5.1201* …. 3.8113** …. 
NORMAL2  1.0750 (0.2908) 0.8533 (0.6300) 
SERIAL2  0.3099 (0.5814) 0.3155 (0.5781) 
ARCH2  1.8146 (0.1746) 1.8450 (0.1739) 
RAMSEY2  0.2447 (0.6600) 2.1113 (0.1224) 
Note: * and ** denote the significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
NORM2 is for normality test, SERIAL2 for LM serial correlation test, ARCH2 for 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity and REMSAY2 for Resay Reset test. 
 
The lower segment of Table-7 reveals that short run models seem to pass all diagnostic tests. The 
results illustrate that error terms are normally distributed with constant variance and zero mean 
for both models. No serial correlation is found between dependent variables and residual term. 
There is no evidence about the existence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) and white heteroskedasticity. Moreover, both models are well specified validated by 
Ramsey reset test statistic. 
 
The VECM Granger Causality Analysis  
Casual relationship between income inequality, defense spending and growth is investigated by 
applying the VECM Granger approach. An appropriate knowledge about the direction of 
causality between the series can help policy makers in crafting an integrated defense and 
economic policy to improve income distribution for sustainable economic growth. Granger, 
(1969) suggested if the series are first difference stationary and cointegrated then the VECM 
Granger is suitable to examine causality relationship between the variables. The results are 
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detailed in Table-8. Our estimated 1tECM  coefficients are significant with negative sign for 
income inequality and economic growth equations. It reveals that the shock exposed by system 
converging to long run equilibrium path at a higher speed for income inequality (-0.5095) as 
compared to adjustment speed of economic growth (-0.1785). 
 
The causality analysis reveals that in long run, defense spending Granger causes income 
inequality. These findings are consistent with existing literature such as Ozsoy, (2008) and 
Elveren, (2012) for Turkey; Hirnissa et al. (2009) for ASEAN countries. The feedback effect is 
found between economic growth and income inequality. This indicates that if economic growth 
deteriorates income inequality then in such situation income inequality retards economic growth 
via limiting access to resources and hence reducing investment in physical as well as human 
capital and vice versa (Shahbaz, 2010). The unidirectional causality exists running from defense 
spending to economic growth. This empirical finding is consistent with Dunne and Vougas, 
(1999) for South Africa; Kollias et al. (2007) for European Union; Karagol and Palaz, (2004) and 
Karagianni and Pempetzoglu, (2009) for Turkey; Shahbaz and Shabbir, (2012) for Pakistan but 
contradictory with Tiwari and Shahbaz, (2012) for India; Shahbaz et al. (2013) for Pakistan and 
Farzanegan, (2012) for Iran.     
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Table-7: The VECM Granger Causality Analysis 
Dependent  
Variable 
Direction of Causality 
Short Run Long Run Joint Long-and-Short Run Causality 
1ln  tIE  1ln  tD  
2
1ln  tD  1ln  tY  1tECT  11,ln  tt ECTIE  11,ln  tt ECTD  1
2
1,ln  tt ECTD  11,ln  tt ECTY  
tIEln  
…. 
2.6567*** 
[0.0872] 
2.9813*** 
[0.0664] 
2.3277 
[0.1155] 
-0.5095** 
[-2.9714] …. 
2.3154*** 
[0.0966] 
2.2875*** 
[0.0966] 
2.9013** 
[0.0517] 
tDln  2.4407*** 
[0.1042] …. 
5.9470* 
[0.041] 
0.7798 
[0.4675] 
 
…. 
 
…. …. 
 
…. 
 
…. 
2ln tD  2.5400*** 
[0.1001] 
7.0181* 
[0.0010] …. 
1.2501 
[0.3014] 
 
…. 
 
…. 
 
…. …. 
 
…. 
tYln  3.4881** 
[0.0440] 
1.4879 
[0.2589] 
1.7915 
[0.1853] …. 
-0.1784** 
[-2.3483] 
4.0750** 
[0.0161] 
2.3423*** 
[0.0946] 
2.6161*** 
[0.0707] …. 
Note: *, ** and *** show significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
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The bidirectional causality exists between income inequality and defense spending in short run. 
In short run, unidirectional causal relationship is found running from income inequality to 
economic growth. Furthermore, our results validated the existence of inverted-U shaped 
relationship between defense spending and income inequality as both linear and nonlinear terms 
of defense spending Granger cause income inequality in short run as well as long run. 
 
V- Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper has assessed the relationship between defense spending and income inequality in Iran 
using annual data over the period of 1971-2011. In doing so, the ARDL bound testing approach 
to cointegration in the presence of structural break is applied after confirming integrating order 
of the variables by using structural break unit root test. Our cointegration analysis shows that 
there is a long run relationship between defense spending, economic growth and income 
inequality. Furthermore, defense spending improves income distribution in Iran. An inverted-U 
shaped relationship between defense spending and income inequality also exists. Economic 
growth increases income inequality. The causality analysis points out that military spending 
Granger causes income distribution. This confirmed the existence of an inverted-U shaped 
relationship between defense spending and income inequality. The feedback hypothesis is 
validated between economic growth and income inequality.  
 
With the notice to the negative effects of defense spending on income inequality, it seems that in 
Iran defense sector is much more attractive for people belonging to low income groups in 
comparison with people in high income groups. The negative relationship between defense 
spending and income inequality in Iran can have multiple explanations. Ali (2012) suggests that 
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“the military establishment in MENA (including Iran) countries is entrenched in all aspect of the 
society and it is complicated to parse-out the efficient from the inefficient allocations of the 
societal resources”. Other possible interpretation could be that the equity value of military 
industrialization more than offset the expense of inefficient allocation of resources hence the 
negative impact of military expenditure on income inequality. Also this negative relationship 
could be indicative of attempts by governments to consolidate their power by providing more 
subsidies and social programs while on the other hand they increase military expenditures. This 
study can be augmented by adding other factors of income inequality while investigating the 
impact of military spending on income inequality. These potential variables are welfare, political 
regimes, democracy, globalization, foreign direct investment etc. The state-level analysis 
between military spending and income inequality (state-level) is necessary to understand the 
dynamics of the relationship between both variables for designing a comprehensive defence and 
economic policies to achieve sustainable economic development in Iran.          
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